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  • ✇The New Yorker
  • The Case for A.I. Optimism
    2026-11-20T19:00:00.000ZSave this storySave this storyListen and subscribe: Apple | Spotify | Wherever You ListenSign up for our daily newsletter to get the best of The New Yorker in your inbox.In Washington, it is essential to read, or at least display, the collected works of Robert Caro. (The spines of “The Power Broker” and the multivolume biography in progress of Lyndon Johnson are compulsory in every Zoom background on cable news.) In Silicon Valley, the required reading list s
     

The Case for A.I. Optimism

2026年11月21日 04:06
2026-11-20T19:00:00.000Z

Listen and subscribe: Apple | Spotify | Wherever You Listen

Sign up for our daily newsletter to get the best of The New Yorker in your inbox.


In Washington, it is essential to read, or at least display, the collected works of Robert Caro. (The spines of “The Power Broker” and the multivolume biography in progress of Lyndon Johnson are compulsory in every Zoom background on cable news.) In Silicon Valley, the required reading list surely includes Richard Rhodes’s “The Making of the Atomic Bomb,” a magisterial history of the discovery of nuclear fission and its epochal resolution with the Manhattan Project and the start of the nuclear age. Not a few of the tech barons and innovators of our time see themselves as neo-Oppenheimers. When A.I. reaches maturity, it may get its Caro or Rhodes. In the meantime, Kevin Roose’s lucid journalistic account “The AGI Chronicles: The Inside Story of the Race to Create an Artificial Superintelligence” does the trick.

Roose is a classic beat reporter, having covered technology for outlets including the Times, The Atlantic, New York, and NPR. Recently, he bolted from the Times to work independently, and, these days, he is co-hosting a podcast, with Casey Newton, called “Machine Gods.” Among the most interesting A.I. podcasters around—on “Dwarkesh Podcast,” “No Priors,” and “Latent Space,” to name a few—Roose stands out for his ability to tell a story with narrative drive. He breaks things down neatly and clearly for the non-expert.

I spoke with Roose for The New Yorker Radio Hour just before Anthropic, Dario Amodei’s A.I. outfit, made what has turned out to be the largest initial public offering of all time. And, of course, while Amodei and his colleagues were coming into their many billions, Jensen Huang, the former king of the Nvidia empire, which has by many metrics powered the A.I. revolution, was appealing to his old board of directors to let him back in after his humbling. On the utopian-to-doomer scale, Roose is . . . hopeful. Or, as they say on the Sabbath Gasbag shows, cautiously optimistic. His interlocutor, by nature, is less so. We had a lot to talk about.

Anthropic is just going public. In their filing paperwork for the first half of 2026, they reported a revenue of $16.3 billion and a net loss of $80.7 billion. The company is also on the hook for $900 billion in future obligations for chips and data-center leases. How do they make the math make sense?

Basically, the bet that investors are making on Anthropic is that it will continue to grow at something close to the rate that it has been growing for the last several years. This is a company that has been growing faster than any company at its scale in the history of capitalism. Four or five years ago, they had essentially no revenue. Three years ago, they had tens of millions in revenue, and it’s been growing tenfold every year for the last three or four years. Not ten per cent; ten times.

That is due, in large part, to the popularity of their models for coding and other white-collar work. And the bet is that this growth just continues—that as these tools get better and more helpful, that more white-collar knowledge workers will incorporate them into their work, and developers will be paying much more, because usage will continue to go up.

The math doesn’t make sense if you think that A.I. is already as popular and widely adopted as it will ever be. It starts to make more sense if you anticipate that what has been happening for the past few years will keep happening—which is that the models get better and more people use them.

Some companies out here in Silicon Valley are already spending more on A.I. tokens than they are on payroll. So the long-term bet is that the economy essentially switches over from running primarily on human labor and paying human salaries to running on A.I. labor and paying token prices.

If that in fact is the right bet to make, give me a picture of the economy on an A.I. basis, as opposed to human labor. What’s it going to look like?

I think it looks a lot like my company. I’m starting a startup, Machine Gods Media. We are a six-person company right now. In our Slack, where we communicate all day, we have six humans and probably a dozen agents. And the agents are doing things we don’t know how to do ourselves. They’re writing code. I just got back from what I jokingly call our engineering department, but it’s really just a bunch of Claudes running around. They’re building tools, helping with scheduling and coördination, with all of the pieces that go into making podcasts, aside from the actual talking into a microphone.

What would those be? Is it so complex that you need Claude to do it?

It turns out to be pretty complex. For example, we have all these deliverables. When you have a show, it needs to get delivered in all these different formats. Apple needs one format, Spotify needs one format, and YouTube needs another format. And it’s all got captions, and titles, and descriptions, and metadata. And all that used to have to be done by hand. Now we have this tool that does it all for us.

Tell me how that works for a big law firm, as opposed to a six-person podcasting outfit.

It might not be a big law firm. It might actually be a small law firm, in terms of the human payroll and footprint. It might be a law firm that only has ten people, but, using A.I., they have access to essentially unlimited amounts of paralegal, junior-associate-quality labor. And so they can do, with ten people, what a more traditional firm might need a thousand people for. That may or may not be possible—there might be gaps in what these models do that might make them unsuited to that level of integration. But that’s the bet that investors are making. It’s not just that Anthropic will continue to grow or that its models will get better, but that A.I. will become the foundation of a new kind of company that will be built on top of A.I.

How many of these companies can prevail in the new world of A.I.? We have Anthropic and OpenAI, among others. Who’s in the lead and why?

Right now there are two clear frontier labs: OpenAI and Anthropic. I would say that, of the two, Anthropic may be slightly ahead; its models are considered better by some metrics. But those two are definitely the front-runners. Then there’s a small-to-medium drop-off before Google DeepMind, which to my mind is the third frontier lab. And then there’s a pretty steep drop after that—to Meta, SpaceX, the Chinese open-model companies, and some other players.

What do I get out of using Anthropic’s Claude, as opposed to OpenAI’s ChatGPT?

I use both of them—I’m pretty promiscuous. I find that some are better for some tasks than for other tasks. I use Claude to write code and to get editorial feedback on my writing. I don’t use A.I. to write, but I do use it to help me revise and edit—

As an editor, I have to stop you there. Do you get editorial feedback that is any good, as compared to when you wrote for the New York Times, or when you wrote your book?

I’ve been blessed and fortunate to have some of the most amazing human editors in my career, including at the Times and at F.S.G., where I published my book. So I hope they’re plugging their ears when they hear this next part: A.I. has gotten really good at editing.

You’re killing me here, Kevin.

I know. Look, I’m not here to tell reassuring fictions. I’m here to tell uncomfortable truths. I had a council of Claudes that would look at my chapters before I submitted them to F.S.G., and give me feedback from various perspectives. I would assign one to be the dyed-in-the-wool A.I. skeptic, and one to be an A.I. historian that knew all of the technical details about the history of these labs. And I would get the feedback in the form of these long dossiers. Maybe ninety per cent of it was crap, but ten per cent was great. My council of Claudes actually caught a few mistakes that would’ve otherwise made it into—

Whoa, whoa, whoa. Ninety per cent of the comments were crap, and you think that’s good editorial counsel?

Well, how much of what your editors give you is useful?

One hundred per cent!

[Laughs.] Well, maybe it’s just my vanity that makes me think it’s only ten per cent useful. But I do feel like, if you’re willing to wade through a bunch of subpar feedback, you can actually find good stuff in there.

The P.R. that I get is that Anthropic is the good company, as you suggest. The job interviews even have a moral dimension. Whereas OpenAI is quite a different thing. Is that fair?

That’s the image that has been portrayed.

What’s the reality?

The reality is that Anthropic and OpenAI are locked in this race together. I think we have been focussing on the wrong question with respect to these companies. I’ve spent time with Sam Altman, with Dario Amodei, and with many leaders and researchers at these companies. We in the tech press are used to asking the question of “Are the people running these companies good and trustworthy?” To my mind, that’s less useful than looking at the technology itself.

A good, moral, ethical person could still build an A.I. model that goes rogue and kills millions of people. On the other side of the coin, someone who is totally craven and corrupt could manage to produce an incredibly ethical A.I. model with all of the proper guardrails. I don’t know that it makes sense to fit the image of the founder or the C.E.O. onto the over-all impression we have of these companies.

In your book, which is fascinating, you write that a surprising number of people who work in these A.I. companies joined because they were . . . terrified. They decided that, if A.I. was going to be built, it would be better for it to be built by people who were scared, who were alarmed, who were cautious, so that the appropriate measures against disaster would be taken. Is there any evidence that these people, who are terrified, are having a significant impact within the companies—to hold them back, restrain them, to modify?

Absolutely. It’s almost impossible to imagine a counterfactual, because the companies were started by people who were terrified of A.I. Sam Altman and Elon Musk started OpenAI, in 2015, because they were scared that Demis Hassabis and Google DeepMind were going to win the race to A.G.I., artificial general intelligence. And then, several years later, Dario Amodei and six of his co-workers at OpenAI left to start Anthropic because they were terrified of the technology, and they didn’t trust Sam Altman to build it safely.

This is a recurring motif in the modern A.I. industry: people who are scared of A.I., and who don’t believe their bosses or rivals are taking enough steps to contain it, break off and start their own companies. They say, “We’re going to be the safe A.G.I. company. Those other guys are going to blow up the world if they do it, but we can be trusted.”

Some of this, it seems to me, has to do with personality, and how that personality is projected to the wider world through the press. Sam Altman projects one kind of personality, and Dario Amodei perhaps another. Tell me a little about those differences and what effect they have.

Sam Altman is a master salesman and fund-raiser. That is his superpower. From a very young age, he was a networker; he was close to major dealmakers in Silicon Valley, and extremely talented at raising money. He ran Y Combinator, the startup incubator, before leaving to become the C.E.O. of OpenAI. His reputation is that of an extremely ambitious, high-E.Q. people pleaser. As someone once told me, his superpower is being able to zero in on exactly what you want to hear and give it to you. That has served him well in some instances and poorly in others, such as when his board decided that he was lying to them and tried to fire him. It has also contributed to his reputation as somewhat two-faced or duplicitous.

What about Dario?

Dario is very high-I.Q., stubborn, and neurotic. He’s a moral absolutist, with a strong belief in what is good and right and righteous. He’s also a brilliant scientist who foresaw many of today’s A.I. trends and dynamics years before anyone else. His superpower—and his kryptonite—is that he cannot lie. Someone close to him once told me, “Dario is a guy who cannot tell a lie to save his life, which is an asset for us on even-numbered days and a liability on odd-numbered days.”

How does that work?

Sometimes it leads to him standing his ground and standing up for his principles. When the Pentagon says, “We want to use Claude for whatever we want to do,” he’s the guy who has the cojones to stand up to them, while everyone else is busy trying to snivel and get on their good side.

The Pentagon banned the use of Claude.

Yes. And a lot of people at Anthropic saw that and admired Dario for standing his ground, even when it would have been expedient for him to say whatever it took to make Pete Hegseth happy. But it also leads to these incredible moments. Remember that press briefing outside the White House, where all these A.I. C.E.O.s were standing in a semicircle? Dario was practically jumping out of his skin, unable to conceal his displeasure at having to stand alongside these cowards. He couldn’t hide it. It was written all over his face. So, I think that’s what they meant by an asset on even-numbered days and a liability on odd-numbered days.

What has stood out most for you in Anthropic’s I.P.O. and the way this has all gone?

I think about the absolute rocket-ship trajectory this company has been on, more than any other company I’ve ever covered, and perhaps more than any company that has ever existed.

The first time I visited Anthropic to report on them was three years ago. Three years—not that long ago. They had a hundred and fifty employees, working out of a cramped office in Jackson Square, in San Francisco. They didn’t even have a sign-in desk. You just took the elevator up and started walking around. They had no plans to make money. They weren’t a commercial enterprise and had barely released a product. They were a bunch of A.I.-safety-obsessed nerds who seemed genuinely worried about the technology.

If you had told me on that first visit that, three years later, this company would go public at a valuation of more than a trillion dollars and become one of the largest companies in the world, I would have laughed in your face. It seemed so unlikely that they would go from a little hundred-and-fifty-person startup to a company with, I think, more than five thousand employees, and one of the biggest in the world.

There’s perhaps a too easy confidence in the world of long-form journalism that what we do is special—that gathering information, analyzing it, and presenting it in narrative form is something A.I. simply won’t be able to do. Whereas asking for the ten best restaurants in Seattle is easy enough: you can scrape that information off the internet and present it. Are we living in a dream?

I think we are. I think there will still be a market for human-authored work—there’s just something about A.I. writing that is hollow and generic. But what’s interesting is that researchers have conducted blind tests in which people are shown two snippets of writing and asked which they prefer. Most of the time, when they don’t know which is which, people prefer the A.I.-generated work.

Really?

But when people learn which one was A.I. and which one was human-written, the preference swaps.

So, what does that tell you?

Almost everyone likes the human-written one.

They like the idea of the human-written one, but they might not innately like the human one at all.

I think the future of at least some writing will involve humans sticking their names on A.I.-generated literature because they don’t want to break that connection, that spell, with the audience.

That is not entirely reassuring, Kevin.

I’m sorry. I wish I had a rosier view.

On the continuum from doomers, people who believe A.I. will kill us all, to those who are absolutely sanguine about this whole thing—who think it’s going to be great and we’re going to work one day a week and spend the rest of our time sunning ourselves and, I don’t know, whistling—you are pretty sanguine about this subject, and the opposite of a doomer. Am I right?

I am an optimist by temperament. I believe that we can and should thread this needle, but we’ve got a lot of work to do.

What concerns you the most?

Right now, what concerns me is an intelligence explosion. That’s a term in the A.I. industry for what could happen after A.I. becomes capable of building A.I. It’s sometimes called “recursive self-improvement.” It’s the idea that an A.I. model becomes superhuman at developing other A.I. models, capable of doing the entire workload of a senior research engineer at OpenAI or Anthropic. That hasn’t happened yet, but some people, including at METR, a credible third-party organization, believe it could happen within the next year. At that point, you could use A.I., in a closed, no-human environment, to train more capable A.I. models.

What are the potential disasters, in concrete terms, that could come out of that manifestation?

If these people are right—and let’s caveat that they might not be—but if we were to see, say, a decade’s worth of improvements in A.I. capabilities compressed into a single year, because all of this could happen at machine speed rather than at human speed, I think we’d be looking at systems that start breaking a lot of things all at once. We’re already seeing some of this with cyberattacks, the incident involving Hugging Face, and the U.S. government scrambling to contain threats to critical infrastructure from these A.I. models. Imagine that, but times ten or times a hundred. There’s just a base rate of chaos and instability—

And, at the same time, a very low propensity toward regulation.

For now. But I think that could change very quickly. In fact, I believe part of the reason the Democrats won the midterms so decisively was—

Anxiety about A.I.

People had anxiety about A.I. So things could change pretty quickly on this. As unpopular as A.I. might be right now, I expect it to be even more unpopular. Right now we’re seeing this massive backlash against A.I. Unemployment is still under five per cent. It was not at all intuitive to me that we would see this level of backlash before any of the widespread job losses arrived.

Well, because you’re reading about it every two seconds, and you’re seeing reports on it on television and YouTube. There’s an anticipatory anxiety about it.

But think about how much more anxiety there would be if people were actually losing their jobs en masse. I desperately want that not to happen, but, to me, the timing of this backlash has been a little surprising, because it seems like there’s still a lot more risk out there to be priced in.

Now, I think you have to be impressed that we’ve gotten this far in our conversation without having mentioned Jensen Huang. What do you make of this? What did we just see? My God, it’s like the worst James Bond plot you have ever experienced.

It really is. It’s dime-store stuff. This is a guy who has been so central to the A.I. boom. Nvidia’s G.P.U.s are the reason we have any of this today.

Tell us what a G.P.U. is.

G.P.U. is a graphics-processing unit. Basically, a modern A.I. chip is descended from these things that gamers used to stick in their PCs to render backgrounds and polygons better. And Jensen Huang is the reason that those chips are now the most valuable commodity in the world—so valued that we’ve had to pass special export controls to prevent China from getting access to them, because, if compute is the determining factor between success and failure, we don’t want them to get our most powerful chips.

Do you figure they have it anyway?

It sure seems like they’ve gotten a bunch of them anyway. And the question is—

Thanks to Alice Huang?

Well, there’s this whole gray market of cutouts in Malaysia, Singapore, and other countries. They’ll buy a bunch of Nvidia chips because they’re allowed to buy them—they’re not China—and then they’ll either set up a data center and give Chinese companies remote access to it, or, in some cases, they’ll just smuggle the chips into China. And one of the major questions going forward is how much of this Jensen Huang knew about. Was he aware that Nvidia chips were being smuggled into China? And how much did his relationship with Alice Huang and Megaspeed factor into that?

So, what are the ramifications of this?

I mean, we’ll see where Jensen Huang ends up. He’s now saying he would like to return to Nvidia. I suspect that won’t work.

I’d like to win the Super Bowl, too, but I don’t think that’s happening.

In the short term, it means that the entire industry will have to approach things slightly differently. For many years, Jensen Huang has been the sole guy with control of the commodity that everyone in A.I. needs—the key ingredient. His relationships really determined who got how many of Nvidia’s latest chips. It was not a pure auction market. It was, like, “Oh, Alice Huang and I are friends, so I’ll save some of these chips for Megaspeed.” Or, “Elon Musk and I go way back. I’ll give him a big allotment.”

Who benefitted most from the relationship?

Elon Musk has gotten a very large allotment of chips that was maybe out of step with his company’s importance in A.I. because he and Jensen Huang are old friends. I think Sam Altman has benefitted from a close relationship with Jensen Huang.

Dario Amodei and Anthropic have actually not had a close relationship with Jensen Huang. As I reported in my book, there was a very tense meeting between Dario Amodei and Jensen Huang—it was the first time they’d met, and Jensen was basically grandstanding about how big the data center they were going to build was, while Dario was peppering him with somewhat rude questions. “Oh, how big is it going to be? What order of magnitude? Where are you going to get the power?” And eventually Dario mutters to someone sitting next to him that Jensen is acting Trump-like, and the two of them didn’t like each other for a long time.

If Dario didn’t have that kind of access for Anthropic, how has he prevailed anyway?

They have adopted a very unusual compute strategy—they have essentially gotten a little bit from everyone. They have a bunch of Amazon chips called Trainium. They rent a bunch of chips from Google, and they have a bunch of Nvidia chips, too. Rather than tethering themselves to one chip company or one hyperscaler, they have drawn from all of them to varying degrees. But they’re compute-constrained just like everyone else in the industry. They wish they had more data centers. They wish they had more chips. No one’s got enough.

I think it’s fair to say that when the internet and the iPhone first appeared we had no real concept of what an unregulated experiment on human consciousness and behavior these things would represent, on all kinds of levels—whether it was about reading, concentration, mental health, or how we related to each other. Here we are again, on the brink of another revolution that is arguably much greater—something vastly more complicated. Despite your optimism, in terms of human relations and the way we live our lives, what are you expecting in the next decade or so?

A decade is so long from now, David.

That’s fair.

I struggle to think about what the world will look like in a year.

Really?

I do. I think parts of it will look largely the same. I will still probably drop my kid off at school, go to the grocery store. There will be parts of my life that are much the same.

But when you and I talk next Thanksgiving, what will we have experienced? What changes will have been brought into our lives over the course of a year?

If the next year plays out in a way that is thoughtful, I think we will have put in place vastly more guardrails.

Where do you get your confidence that thoughtfulness is anywhere in abundance in the U.S. government, or anywhere else?

Thoughtful, or maybe just self-interested. I think we have a deep desire to remain in control of our society, of our government, of our surroundings, of our lives. We still want to be in the driver’s seat. And as long as we recognize that A.I. is not just a tool or a hype bubble but is actually, in some sense, a type of entity that could displace us at the top of the intelligence ladder . . . We could be the second-smartest thing on earth a year from now, and I think we have a lot to do between now and then. But my hope would be that we look back and say, “Wow, that was a crazy year, and a bunch of cybersecurity incidents happened, and we fixed a bunch of stuff just in time, and it was like Y2K. It could have been this major crisis, but we averted it through heroic effort and late nights at the computer terminal.” That, I think, is the good outcome.

That’s a lot of close calls to endure and still be an optimist.

We’ve done it before.

When?

Y2K, the Cold War. The Industrial Revolution played out over seventy-five or eighty years, but we muddled through. It did not lead to human extinction.

A lot of people talk about a kill switch for A.I., as if, when things get out of hand, suddenly somebody goes to a special room and turns a switch and A.I. is turned off and things can settle down, and whatever is broken can be fixed. What is a kill switch? Is it an imaginary construct or is it a real thing?

It’s an imaginary construct. I think it comes from science-fiction movies or thrillers where—

That’s where I get all my best stuff.

The red lights in the control room start blinking, and the engineer sprints over to the server rack and yanks out the cord—

Clips the blue wire instead of the red wire. Bruce Willis always chooses correctly.

Unfortunately, that is not how modern A.I. systems are running. They are distributed across huge numbers of servers and data centers. And there’s been some research into how these things can actually replicate themselves on smart devices, like smart ovens and toasters in your home. We can’t just pull the plug if it might mean taking down some huge chunk of computers across the world.

In a few years, are we going to be at twenty-five-per-cent unemployment?

I hope not. I hope we will continue to find useful and valuable things to do, but I think a lot of that depends on the decisions we make not just as a public sector, as the government, as regulators, but as employers and business leaders. I mean, do you fire your human workers as soon as they’re no longer technically adding anything to the organization, or do you retrain them for some other part of the job? I hope that we have enlightened leaders out there who will see it as part of their responsibility not to conduct layoffs as soon as it’s technically feasible.

Where does your sense of confidence, whether in the government or the private sector, reside?

My confidence resides in the public, actually. As recipients, users, and, in some cases, victims of this technology, we are not powerless or impotent. We have seen large, society-altering technological transformations turn out great, because people made it turn out great. My optimism also comes from the general belief that technology usually makes our lives better in the long run. ♦

The New Yorker Radio Hour is a co-production of WNYC Studios and The New Yorker.

  • ✇The New Yorker
  • A Meeting with Venezuela’s Delcy Rodríguez
    2026-11-20T19:00:00.000ZSave this storySave this storyListen and subscribe: Apple | Spotify | Wherever You ListenSign up for our daily newsletter to get the best of The New Yorker in your inbox.Since the United States seized and imprisoned President Nicolás Maduro, in January, and asserted control over Venezuela’s oil production, Marco Rubio has effectively called the shots. But, rather than inviting the Trump-friendly opposition leader María Corina Machado back from exile,
     

A Meeting with Venezuela’s Delcy Rodríguez

2026年11月21日 04:06
2026-11-20T19:00:00.000Z

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A red text card that reads “The New Yorker Radio Hour | WNYC.”

Since the United States seized and imprisoned President Nicolás Maduro, in January, and asserted control over Venezuela’s oil production, Marco Rubio has effectively called the shots. But, rather than inviting the Trump-friendly opposition leader María Corina Machado back from exile, the U.S. elevated a loyal Maduro deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, to run a puppet regime. Who is Rodríguez, and what motivated her to make her peace with an imperial takeover? The New Yorker staff writer Jon Lee Anderson recently returned from a rare interview with Rodríguez and her brother and political consort, Jorge Rodríguez; he also spoke at length with two U.S. operatives who conceived the attack that culminated in Maduro’s abduction. He talks with David Remnick about the state of play in Venezuela, and what the Trump Administration’s designs on Cuba may be.

Further reading:

New episodes of The New Yorker Radio Hour drop every Tuesday and Friday. Follow the show wherever you get your podcasts.

The New Yorker Radio Hour is a co-production of WNYC and The New Yorker.

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  • The Former Trump Official Who Thinks Trump’s Staff Has Let Him Down
    2026-11-20T11:00:00.000ZSave this storySave this storyIn his new book, “The President Deserves Better: Leadership and Accountability to Keep America Great,” John Ullyot argues that President Donald Trump’s advisers and appointees have let him down in his faltering second term. As Ullyot, a former deputy assistant to Trump at the White House who has held several government jobs during Trump’s Administrations, including as chief spokesman for the National Security Council,
     

The Former Trump Official Who Thinks Trump’s Staff Has Let Him Down

2026年11月20日 20:06
2026-11-20T11:00:00.000Z

In his new book, “The President Deserves Better: Leadership and Accountability to Keep America Great,” John Ullyot argues that President Donald Trump’s advisers and appointees have let him down in his faltering second term. As Ullyot, a former deputy assistant to Trump at the White House who has held several government jobs during Trump’s Administrations, including as chief spokesman for the National Security Council, writes “The bottom line is this: The President deserves better.” He adds, “And it’s not just from his Cabinet Secretaries. Many individuals and groups work behind the scenes to block or slow-roll Trump’s reform agenda. You often hear about how liberal media outlets and the foot-dragging, antireform, bureaucratic Deep State try to stop Trump. This book provides a first-hand account of how that happens on a day-to-day basis.”

Recently, in The Atlantic, Ullyot called for the resignation of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, whom he had advised at the Pentagon in 2025, saying that Hegseth had mismanaged the Iran war and was becoming an embarrassment to the President. (In April of that year, Ullyot detailed the chaos at the Pentagon under Hegseth in Politico.) I recently spoke by phone with Ullyot about his time working with Trump, and the source of the problems in the President’s Administration. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below.

I read your Atlantic piece calling for Hegseth’s resignation. What is it that you think he has done wrong?

Hegseth has done a lot of damage to the Pentagon and to the military. I volunteered to stand up his press operation just for a short period of time at the start of his term last year, and he and I got along very well. When I left, as planned, after standing up his operation and turning it over to his friend—a friend of his that he had selected to run the operation—he thanked me for doing a good job, et cetera. And then it was after that that things got very crazy. I didn’t notice a lot of crazy things going on when I was there, but it was after that point, after I left, that I decided to write that op-ed in Politico. And that was because things had gotten so crazy that he had two of my friends marched out of the building by security, and he accused them of leaking material to the press, and he just had become very paranoid about the leaks.

Hegseth is the least qualified and most polarizing Defense Secretary in modern memory. And as a Marine veteran, and as someone who has spent a lot of time in both the Senate Armed Services Committee and at the National Security Council working with senior members of the military and senior Pentagon leaders, I felt the need to speak out, because he was doing real damage and it was hurting the President as well.

He was appointed to the job by President Trump, right?

Yes.

So how do you understand President Trump’s decision to appoint him, and also to keep him in the job, even as he’s doing this tremendous damage that you referenced?

So, the President hired him. In his first term, President Trump hired people based on recommendations from many people who were outsiders. And he felt, I believe, that he was not well served by several of them. In his second term, it has been different. He’s hired more on loyalty and hired more people who are going to pursue his agenda rather than those who have a résumé.

So is Hegseth pursuing Trump’s agenda?

I think he is in a lot of ways. The President decided to go to war in Iran, and the Secretary reportedly pushed him into that. I do not think that the President has paid attention to the damage that Hegseth has done on either the cultural front or the self-promoting front, or to the damage that he’s done in taking out very good leaders of the military. I think that the President is mainly briefed on what’s going on at the Pentagon by Pete Hegseth, and doesn’t have people around him who have apprised him of the job that Hegseth’s doing and the damage that he’s done.

If Trump could focus a little more, sit down, read a briefing book on what Hegseth was doing, it might be easier to get him to come around to what you’re saying.

Yeah, I think that’s right. But I really do think that the President hired Hegseth without really looking under the hood. He watches Fox News a lot, and Hegseth, he’s very bombastic, outspoken; he really shouts into the camera on Fox News. And I think President Trump said, “Hey, this guy must be a real military hero. He’s a man’s man, et cetera.” I doubt that he looked at his résumé much, because a lot of people are surprised that Hegseth was not a SEAL Team Six door-kicker or something like that. But he has a persona, and he wrote three books about lethality in the military. I read all three of them before going to work for him.

Oh, wow.

Yeah, and basically they all say the same thing, and they can be summed up with one page: The military’s gone woke. And, No beardos, no weirdos, no trannies, no fatties, this type of thing.

Did that message appeal to you when you first joined the Administration, but then you thought, Oh, maybe the “no beardos, no weirdos” thing is not actually the way to carry out the running of the Pentagon?

I wrote an op-ed back when Hegseth was still in high school, when I left the Marine Corps, about the need to keep high physical standards, because that was going out, particularly with integrating women into Marine units. Anyway, so I’m not agreeing with him. He’s not the person who invented the idea of high physical standards. And then, in terms of his criticism of how identity politics were woven into the military, I agreed with that. But I wouldn’t make it a big deal. I would just get it done. So I didn’t think you needed to beat your chest about restoring . . . whether it’s in any government position, I agree with eliminating identity politics or identity-based hiring. So I was on board with both of those, but I wasn’t screaming about it.

“Talk softly and carry a big stick” kind of thing.

Yeah, just make the changes and don’t make a big deal about it.

It does occur to me that people who write books that, as you say, can be summarized by lines like “No beardos, no weirdos” might not be so laser-focussed on really running the department as well as they should, and might be more focussed on being obnoxious and things like that. I don’t know. I’m just speculating.

Yeah, I think that’s right. I mean, with his résumé and his bombast, I think that he was probably qualified to be the Pentagon spokesperson, or since he spends a lot of time P.T.ing with the troops, he could have been head of the Presidential physical-fitness council, like Arnold Schwarzenegger was. But, actually, you need a manager or somebody with real management experience to run the largest department in the federal government.

Let’s just go back to President Trump, because your book is very interesting on this idea that Trump has been let down by the people around him in his second term. Is the problem Hegseth, or is the problem more that Trump didn’t do his due diligence?

I don’t think he did due diligence. I think President Trump just saw him on Fox News, liked what he saw, and didn’t say, O.K., let’s look into his background.

Is that then the fault of people around Trump, or is it more Trump’s fault? Because your book is saying that Trump himself is a very effective leader, but that he’s been let down. So I’m curious how you think that through.

So I think that ultimately the buck stops with the President. So, when I say the President deserves better, yes, he deserves better from his staff, but above all he deserves better from himself. Let’s say you’re a friend of a pro golfer and the pro golfer knows that he can do better. You would say, “Hey, look, I think you deserve better than that. You deserve to train a little more or to work on your swing with a swing coach,” et cetera. It’s not a great analogy.

No.

Like any C.E.O., the President is the steward of his own brand. And his brand has slipped badly. But he needs to have staff that are not yes-men. He never did this in the first term, but if you look at these scripted or televised Cabinet meetings where they’ll go on for an hour, the Cabinet meetings with the cameras rolling, they’ll just go around while all the Cabinet members are trying to outdo each other. Each Cabinet member’s trying to outdo the others in praising the President. And that’s not serious. The President doesn’t need that, but ultimately he’s responsible.

Trump’s first Cabinet meeting, in 2017, five months into his term, included a lot of praise, if I remember correctly.

Well, I mean, that could have been the case, but now every Cabinet meeting is televised. I mean, in the first term there were some serious people there who were supporters of the President, but they were not seal clappers the way you see a lot in this Administration.

I am looking now, and in June of 2017, at that first Cabinet meeting, they did go around the room praising him. But, as you say, there’s going around the room and praising him, and then there’s going around the room and really praising him. So you have to draw distinctions, which I think is what you are trying to do.

That’s right. I’ve been in and out of the private sector and advise C.E.O.s, and I say a good C.E.O. surrounds himself with people who are strong enough to tell him what he doesn’t want to hear. And one of them that I worked with was Alan Mulally, when he was C.E.O. of Ford, and they were doing the auto-bailout hearings, back in December of 2008. Mulally was great to work with, and, famously, when he took over Ford, he had his first review of the business units and all the charts, and he said, “Put a green, yellow, or red chart based on how your business unit is doing.” So it was all green while the company was losing billions. And then one executive finally put up a red slide, and Mulally just started applauding him, and later that executive became C.E.O. and replaced Mulally. Mulally wanted to hear the bad news, probably before the good news.

Does it seem to you that Trump wants to hear the bad news before the good news?

No, I don’t think so. I think he deserves better from himself on that. He deserves to look under the hood much more than he has been doing in his second term.

Your book is about how the President deserves better from his staff, but it seems like one of the things you’re saying in this conversation is that the President deserves better from himself, which is a little different.

Yes, that’s right. He made three promises when I worked for him as a senior adviser on the 2016 campaign: no more forever wars, drain the swamp, and put America first. In his first term, when I worked for him in the White House, he was new to Washington and very laser-focussed on delivering on those priorities.

When I remember the first term, it was a lot of tweeting in the middle of the night. It was a lot of staying in the residence to watch Fox News. It was a lot of golfing. I’m not saying things are exactly the same as this term, but when you say the President was laser-focussed on his priorities, I’m trying to remember that.

No, you’re right about his tweeting and his watching TV and staying up late. That hasn’t changed, but what I think has changed in this second term is that he has lost focus on implementing his promises.

I think the ballroom is distracting him. Honestly, I think that’s one of the problems.

Yeah, exactly. So, anyway, things slipped in the second term. Now you’ve got former aides who are cashing in on his name.

Is he cashing in, too, do we think?

I don’t think he is, but certainly there are allegations that his family is. I mean, I think that he’s not personally—

Oh, so you think it’s more his family than him?

Well, it’s his family, but it’s also, let’s look at the ballroom or the library. He is building these big projects that need a lot of money, and so any donor to any President does not contribute to their projects five years after they’ve been President. They’re all lining up to contribute when the President has the power. But, in draining the swamp, that was his promise to be a different President, and now you’ve got his aides.

But do you think that flows from the top? Maybe this gets back to what you say about the fact that he himself deserves better. Maybe he should tell himself to tell his family not to focus on business deals.

Right. This was not a visible embarrassment in the first term. Now it’s a visible embarrassment, and, in fact, he’s reportedly surprised by some of these revelations. So, when we come back to “the President deserves better,” he should have set the tone in the second term and said, “No more of this B.S., I’m different. That’s why I was elected in 2016, because people wanted me to drain the swamp, and I don’t want to have anybody, whether it’s my family or anybody else, riding on my name.”

I think one important thing about your book is getting the message out there that he needs to do this.

Yeah. I appreciate that. That’s what I was trying to do in writing the book. And I had no idea when I started writing it a year and a half ago that the Republican Party would take the shellacking that it did. I mean, nine Senate seats. I worked in the Senate for seven years, and nine seats is seventeen per cent of all the senators. I looked it up—seventeen per cent of the entire collection of senators in the chamber.

Wouldn’t nine Senate seats be nine per cent of the Senate?

Of the Republicans. Republicans had fifty-three. If you divide nine out of fifty-three—

Of course, yeah, my mistake.

Yeah, no worries. So, anyway, nine seats is a lot of seats. Anyway, when I started writing this book, I was saying it is maybe intended for future Presidents, but now it has become a lot more relevant to this President.

Well, honestly, if there’s a theme to this conversation, I think it’s that if Trump had read Hegseth’s books, or if he reads your book now, things could be better. Maybe Trump reading more books is the solution here.

Yeah, maybe that’s the solution.

Last question for you: What if someone said, “Look, this Donald Trump, he’s got a little older, he’s surrounded by more loyalists, but fundamentally, this is the guy who, from the start, talked about Obama’s birth certificate, and then he talked about ‘Mexican’ judges, and then he insulted people all the time, and there are all these accusations about how he assaults women, and then there were all these things that he said about Haitians, and January 6th, and then you go to the second term, and he’s posting the video of the Obamas as apes, and actually he is just the same guy who never really had any sense of how to run the country or a sense of the national interest”? I’m not saying there’s any merit to this idea, but what do you think of it?

Well, no, I think that’s a very good point. What I would say is he’s the same man, but, politically, voters were once willing to overlook this pugilistic, crude character tweeting about the Obamas as apes and all of that business.

It seems as if you wish Trump would remind himself, and remind people, that fundamentally he was a businessman who came to shake up Washington. If he could get back to that, maybe he could get back on the right track.

Yeah, absolutely. There’s still a runway for him to get things done. ♦

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